Iconoclasm, the Eucharist and the Resurrection of the Flesh

June 29, 2007

Those who reject the veneration of icons usually proffer reasons claiming that the veneration of icons is contrary to biblical commands. I think a serious reading of the iconoclast controversy and resurrgence of iconoclasm among the Reformers who used much the same line of argumentation reveals a different reason for the rejection of the veneration of icons. Here are some useful selections that I think support that claim from Ambrosios Giakalis’ Images of the Divine: The Theology of Icons at the Seventh Ecumenical Council. I think it is possible to see a parallel line of thinking from the Iconoclast rejection of matter as being capable of being deified and their resulting eucharistic doctrine, to the Protestant rejection icons and of the real presence of Christ in the Eucharist. There are significant lines to draw between the conception of matter and form posed by the iconoclasts and the later conception of matter per Galileo in the Renaissance as intrinsically extensional. Other lines can be drawn from the iconoclast theology regarding symbolic though impersonal representation of God and Gnostic and contemporary Feminist cries for inclusive language. You can see some of these issues in the background of this Reformed/Lutheran argument. This entry is a good bit of reading, but I think you will find it profitable. Emphases are my own as are any typographical errors.

“…it appears from the iconoclasts’ acceptance of the ‘deification’ (theosis) of the bread of the Eucharist ‘as through a certain sanctification by grace’ that, unlike their opponents, they do not admit any real distinction between divine essence and divine energy.  At the same time they regard matter as generally ‘ignoble’ (adoxon) ‘common and ‘worthless‘ (koinen kai atimon) and, moreover the hands of the painter as ‘profane’ (deilous) and, by extension, his work similarly so to such a degree that it is impossible either for the material or for the work of ar produced from it to be sanctified by ’sacred prayer.’

Therein lies the following paradox: Although they accept the ‘deification’ of matter in the unique case of the sanctified bread of the Eucharist, they appear to reject any other possibility of the sanctification of reality…Clearly this hostility of the iconoclasts to matter springs directly from the possibilities for iconoic representation inherent in it, which they immediately associate with the pagan manufacture of idols…Thus the iconoclasts’ conception of reality, in spite of its external reliance of the Jewish aniconic tradition, does not differ very much, on their own admission, from the diametrically oppossed Greek tradition. With regard to their arguments concerning the eucharistic bread as alone having the exclusive power to represent Christ, we can clearly discern a totally Greek distinction between ‘matter’ and ’shape’, or ‘form’, as Aristotle would have said:

“Just as that which Christ received from us is the matter alone of human substance perfect in every respect, which does not characterize an individually subsisting persons, lest and additional person be admitted into the Godhead, so also the image is offered of special matter, namely, the substance of the bread, which does not represent the shape of a man, lest idolatry be introduced.”

Read the rest of this entry »

25 Comments | Christology, Essence/Energies, Gnosticism, Icons, Person and Nature, Platonism, The Incarnation | Permalink
Posted by Perry Robinson

I will have mercy on whomever I will have mercy

June 15, 2007

Verse 20, 21. “Shall the thing formed say to Him that formed it, Why hast Thou made me thus? Hath not the potter (Read Jeremiah 18:1-10) power, of the same lump to make one vessel unto honor, and another unto dishonor?”

Here it is not to do away with free-will that he says this, but to show, up to what point we ought to obey God. For in respect of calling God to account, we ought to be as little disposed to it as the clay is. For we ought to abstain not from gainsaying or questioning only, but even from speaking or thinking of it at all, and to become like that lifeless matter, which followeth the potter’s hands, and lets itself be drawn about anywhere he may please. And this is the only point he applied the illustration to, not, that is, to any enunciation of the rule of life, but to the complete obedience and silence enforced upon us. And this we ought to observe in all cases, that we are not to take the illustrations quite entire, but after selecting the good of them, and that for which they were introduced, to let the rest alone. As, for instance, when he says, “He couched, he lay down as a lion;” (Numbers 24:9) let us take out the indomitable and fearful part, not the brutality, nor any other of the things belonging to a lion. And again,
when He says, “I will meet them as a bereaved bear” (Hosea 13:8), let us take the vindictiveness. And when he says, “our God is a consuming fire” (Deuteronomy 4:24; and Hebrews 12:29), the wasting power exerted in punishing. So also here must we single out the clay, the potter, and the vessels. And when he does go on to say, “Hath not the potter power over the clay, of the same lump to make one vessel unto honor, and another unto dishonor?” do not suppose that this is said by Paul as an account of the creation, nor as implying a necessity over the will, but to illustrate the sovereignty and difference of dispensations; for if we do not take it in this way, divers incongruities will follow for if here he were speaking about the will, and those who are good and those not so, He will be Himself the Maker of these, and man will be free from all responsibility. And at this rate, Paul will also be shown to be at variance with himself, as he always bestows chief honor upon free choice. There is nothing else then which he here wishes to do, save to persuade the hearer to yield entirely to God, and at no time to call Him to account for anything whatever. For as the potter (he says) of the same lump makes what he pleaseth, and no one forbids it; thus also when God, of the same race of men, punisheth some, and honoreth others, be not thou curious nor meddlesome herein, but worship only, and imitate the clay. And as it followeth the hands of the potter, so do thou also the mind of Him that so ordereth things. For He worketh nothing at random, or mere hazard, though thou be ignorant of the secret of His Wisdom. Yet thou allowest the other of the same lump to make divers things, and findest no fault: but of Him you demand an account of His punishments and honors, and will not allow Him to know who is worthy and who is not so; but since the same lump is of the same substance, you assert that there are the same dispositions. And, how monstrous this is! And yet not even is it on the potter that the honor and the dishonor of the things made of the lump depends, but upon the use made by those that handle them, so here also it depends on the free choice. Still, as I said before, one must take this illustration to have one bearing only, which is that one should not contravene God, but yield to His incomprehensible Wisdom. For the examples ought to be greater than the subject, and than the things on account of which they are brought forward, so as to draw on the hearer better. Since if they were not greater and did not mount far above it, he could not attack as he ought, and shame the objectors. However, their ill-timed obstinacy he silenced in this way with becoming superiority. And then he introduces his answer. Now what is the answer?

Read the rest of this entry »

2 Comments | Free Will | Permalink
Posted by monkpatrick

Law, sin, death and free-will

June 14, 2007

“For we know that the Law is spiritual: but I am carnal, sold under sin.”
After having said that great evils had taken place, and that sin, taking occasion by the commandment, had grown stronger, and the opposite of what the Law mainly aimed at had been the result, and after having thrown the hearer into a great deal of perplexity, he goes on next to give the rationale of these events, after first clearing the Law of any ill suspicion. For lest — upon hearing that it was through the commandment that sin took that occasion, and that it was when it came that sin revived, and through it deceived and killed — any one should suppose the Law to be the source of these evils, he first sets forth its defense with considerable advantage, not clearing it from accusation only, but encircling it also with the utmost praise. And this he lays down, not as granting it for his own part, but as declaring a universal judgment. “For we know,” he says, “that the Law is spiritual.” As if he had said, This is an allowed thing, and self evident, that it “is spiritual,” so far is it from being the cause of sin, or to blame for the evils that have happened. And observe, that he not only clears it of accusation, but bestows exceeding great praise upon it. For by calling it spiritual, he shows it to be a teacher of virtue and hostile to vice; for this is what being spiritual means, leading off from sin of every kind’.

Read the rest of this entry »

70 Comments | Biblical Exegesis, Church Fathers, Creation and Necessity, Free Will, Original Sin, Person and Nature, The Problem of Evil, Uncategorized | Permalink
Posted by monkpatrick

The Holy Scriptures fix our doctrine, not the dialectical reasoning of man.

June 8, 2007

“But while the latter proceeded, on the subject of the soul, as far in the direction of supposed consequences as the thinker pleased, we are not entitled to such license, I mean that of affirming what we please; we make the Holy Scriptures the rule and the measure of every tenet; we necessarily fix our eyes upon that, and approve that alone which may be made to harmonize with the intention of those writings. We must therefore neglect the Platonic chariot and the pair of horses of dissimilar forces yoked to it, and their driver, whereby the philosopher allegorizes these facts about the soul; we must neglect also all that is said by the philosopher who succeeded him and who followed out probabilities by rules of art (i.e. the syllogism), and diligently investigated the very question now before us, declaring that the soul was mortal  by reason of these two principles; we must neglect all before and since their time, whether they philosophized in prose or in verse, and we will adopt, as the guide of our reasoning, the Scripture, which lays it down as an axiom that there is no excellence in the soul which is not a property as well of the Divine nature.” –St. Gregory of Nyssa, Nicene and Post Nicene Fathers II V. 5, p. 439.

69 Comments | Biblical Exegesis, Church Fathers, Dialectic and Theological Method, Platonism | Permalink
Posted by photios

A Good Question

June 1, 2007

According to Jonathan Prejean, I asked good questions. Part of good philosophy is framing questions clearly to help get to the heart of the matter. You don’t have all the time in the world, so asking good questions is a way of scraping away unnecessary steps.  My question was part of a discussion at Triumphications concerning the nature of grace (and the grace of nature) and the Theotokos. I want to know, qua explanation, if the Catholic model can explain why God has Mary immaculately conceived and free from inherited albeit analogical guilt, why not just skip all of the evil in the world and do this for everyone? Or perhaps more strongly, why not create everyone in a state of confirmed grace? This kind of question is significant for lots of reasons. Currently in the literature on the problem of evil, this essential question has been a major objection to Plantinga type free will defenses. I have seen it proposed in one form or another by everyone from typical atheologians as well as process and open theists. But on to Jonathan’s reply.

Jonathan replied: “I could have prevented the possibility of either of my children committing actual sin by slaughtering them after they were baptized. Why didn’t I do that? This I think shows the inadequacy of your underlying worry about the problem of evil. There is a purpose in people being allowed to be subject to evil, even if that purpose is necessarily inscrutable to reason. I will let my children possibly be damned to Hell, not because I hate them, but because I love them. I suspect it is the same with God.”

I responded with the following: “I don’t think you have given the proper analogy. God could have prevented lots of moral evil, not by doing some evil to human agents but by doing some great good to them. If you could have given your child a proverbial pill to prevent them from not only sinning but ever dying or any serious suffering, wouldn’t you do so? Now, you may object that your ways aren’t the ways of God. Fair enough, but given the imago dei, it is also true that we have via reason, barring Calvinism and Jansenism, a genuine notion of goodness. I can’t see why it wouldn’t be good to give them the pill. Do you?”  

Read the rest of this entry »

52 Comments | Free Will, Monothelitism, Monothelitism/Monergism, Original Sin, Person and Nature, Predestination, Synergy, The Problem of Evil, Uncategorized | Permalink
Posted by Perry Robinson