So very often in discussing matters of theological importance the common complaint against the Orthodox distinction between essence and energy raises its head. The claim comes in a variety of forms but usually the gist is that this is a “later development” read back into earlier theological works. If I think that they are present in these earlier works, I am essentially believing a fiction, for it just ain’t so, or so I am often told. This was a common refrain back on Pontifications.
St Gregory Palamas on Eunomios and more
October 21, 2007I am sure that this must have been posted before but as a refresher in the context of recent posts it may be helpful.
In refuting Eunomios, who claimed that the essence of God is revealed by created things, St Basil the Great writes that ‘created things manifest wisdom, art and power but not essence’. Thus the divine energy made manifest by created things is both uncreated and yet not God’s essence; and those who like Barlaam and Akindynos say that there is no difference between the divine essence and the divine energy are clearly Eunomians.
St Gregory Palamas Chapter 83: “Topics of Natural and Theological Science” in The Philokalia Vol 4. A few more quotes from the same source relating the distinction of essence and energies to will:
If the divine essence does not in any respect differ from the divine energy, then the act of generation and of procession will in no respect differ from the act of creating[,]… then neither does it differ from the divine will. Thus the Son who is begotten from the Father’s essence, is according to these people also created from the Father’s will[,]… and if the holy fathers testify that God has many energies – for… He has creative providences and goodnesses – then God also has many essences. This is a view that no member of the Christian race has ever uttered or entertained.
;
If the energies of God do not in any respect differ from the divine essence, then neither will they differ from one another. Therefore, God’s will is in no way different from His foreknowledge, and consequently either God does not foreknow all things – because He does not will all that occurs – or else He wills evil also, since He foreknows all. This means either that He does not foreknow all things which is the same as saying that He is not God, or that He is not good, which is also the same as saying He is not God. Thus God’s foreknowledge does differ from His will, and so both differ from the divine essence.
;and
If the divine energies do not differ form one another, then God’s creative power is not distinct from His foreknowledge. But in that case, since God began to create at a particular moment, He also began to foreknow at a particular moment. Yet if God did not have foreknowledge of all things before the ages how could He be God? If God’s creative energy does not differ in any respect from divine foreknowledge, then created things are concurrent with God’s foreknowledge. Thus because God unoriginately has foreknowledge and what is foreknown is unoriginately foreknown, it follows that God creates unoriginiately, and therefore that created things will have been created unoriginately. But how shall He be God if His creatures are in no way subsequent to Him? If God’s creative energy in no respect differs from His foreknowledge, then the act of creating is not subject to His will, since His foreknowledge is not so subject. In that case God will create, not by an act of volition, but simply because it is His nature to create. But how will he be God if He creates without volition?
As St Gregory demonstrates, one gets into many difficulties holding absolute divine simplicity without distinguishing between essence and energies, or by trying to force the God of Revelation into pagan theistic models and categories, which I believe are insufficient to deal with the Trinity, the Incarnation and creation beginning by God’s volition at a particular moment from non-existence. It follows, in line with St Gregory, that only with the essence/energy distinction can one hope to be speaking of the Biblical God. Also, although not to be taken too far, we can see from our understanding of created energy that the uncreated divine energies tell against a static God but rather tell of a dynamic God. Of course God transcends human/created experience of dynamism and He is not subject to changing His mind nor to passions. These things in Scripture are not pointing to who God is but to our synergy in salvation. It tells of our freedom of will because God is unchanging in willing all men to be saved but yet few are chosen. Our choices bring different consequences, which can be described in human terms of God relenting or getting angry, but one should not ascribe these to God in a human way of changing His mind or becoming passionate.
Two Sides, Same Coin
October 19, 2007Andrew Sandlin gets it. Finally. He recognizes that the conception of God workng in the majorities of western theology, whether Calvinistic or that of the Open Theists is the deity of Greek philosophy.
“I agree entirely with my friend Peter Leithart’s thoughtful renunciation of the typical liberal charge that the orthodox construction of the Trinity is a Hellenic profanation of primitive, Biblical Christianity. Peter is right that subordinationism, not Trinitarianism, is the profanation. I would add that the classical conception of God is flawed by the same factor. Pinnock, Nash et al. have shown beyond doubt that the ideas of an impassible, static, timeless deity are pagan (Hellenic) to the core.
Whoever this god is (and snatches of him are found no less in the Westminster Confession than in Rome), He is not the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ — the God who covenants with His people, risks His love, changes His mind, gets mad, grieves over betrayal, sends lying spirits, tempts Satan to tempt His faithful ones, drowns nearly an entire race, calls things that are not as though they are.
Both Open Theism and classical (pagan) theology proper postulate a false god.”
Of course, the conception of “classical” theology isn’t “classical.” This is just intellectual imperialism. “Classical” means Latin Augustinianism. And I wouldn’t put that much academic weight on the shoulders of Pinnock and Nash. They themselves qua Open Theist and qua Calvinist are still stuck in the Platonic Matrix.
I’d argue that a correct patristic notion of divine impassibility doesn’t posit a static deity. Of course it won’t necessarily be the conception of the Scholastics or the Reformers. Sandlin isn’t fully self conscious about how far down the Hellenism goes since he left out also rejecting the Filioque, personalistic predestinarianism, union with Christ in terms of extrinsic relationships, etc. But hey, baby steps to Jesus.
Who’s Your Daddy?
October 19, 2007Ok, so this is shameless and corny but the award for best religion blog is up for graps at http://www.bloggerschoiceawards.com/
We’re listed so please consider voting for us.
Sound Familiar?
October 18, 2007“But we, persuaded by holy and blessed men, affirm that the mystery of Godliness is neither in the dignity of names, nor in the specificity of practices and sacrametnal mysteries, but rather in the exactness of teachings.”
Eunomius, NPNF v : 238
Compare with this.
Accepting Augustine: The Dialectic of Opposition in Orthodoxy
October 18, 2007Beginning with Adolph von Harnack and Reinhold Seeberg in the Nineteenth century, the first historians of doctrine in the modern, comprehensive and systematic sense, there is a growing awareness of a sea-change in the fourth century, a change associated with the name of St. Augustine of Hippo Regius. The Byzantinist Joan M. Hussey remarks, in her little book, Church and Learning in the Byzantine Empire that “insofar as it is possible to assign a watershed, that comes in the fourth century, between those who follow Augustine on the one hand, and those who follow the Cappadocians on the other.” The comment, coming as it does from a scholar of a civilization, and by no means a theologian, is a significant one, for it means that underlying all other expressions of the problem, be they cultural, canonical, or even liturgical, the underlying problem is dogmatic and more specifically Trinitarian.
Even St. Maximus the Confessor indicates as much. When the inquiry is made concerning the presence of the filioque in some of the formularies of the Latin West, he accepts the doctrine, but only insofar as expressing the sending of the Spirit by the Son, and explicitly rejects the doctrine in its Augustinian form.
But the most succinct statements of the problem may be found in the early twentieth century Calvinist historian James Orr’s Progress of Dogma:
“With Augustine, theology passes from East to West, and from the region of theology proper to that of anthropology. Not that this great Father was not a theologian in the stricter sense as well. No man plunged deeper than he into the mysteries of the divine nature in his discussions of the Trinity.” (p. 131)
On this point, the perception both of Eastern Orthodox and Western scholars regarding the position and significance is the same. Read the rest of this entry »
Here’s a Dot
October 17, 2007“According to Rowan Williams, the central concern is with the freedom of God’s will. Arius insists that God is self-subsistent, and because he is immaterial he is “without any kind of plurality or composition.” If the Son is eternally with God, then there is something beside God that qualifies or limits Him, and God is unlimited. To be in relation is to be limited and qualified, and God is absolute. As Williams says, “if God is free in respect of every contingent, mutable and passible reality, the Word exists because God chooses that he should.” For Williams, Arius’s theology is very “conservative,” affirming what earlier writers would have affirmed: “God is free, the world need not exist, the Word is other than God, the Word is part of the world, so the Word is freely formed ex nihilo.” If the Father “necessarily” begets the Son, then His freedom is qualified and limited by some necessity. In addition, as Letham points out, Arians “wanted to protect God from involvement in creation, from human experiences and sufferings. Jesus’ human limitations showed that he was inferior to God.”
Now, in philosophical theology, who does Arius’ God sound like? Absolutely simple unlimited being to which all relations are extrinsic…hmmm.
“From this, we can see that the assumptions behind Arianism are precisely Hellenistic assumptions. To be absolute means to be entirely unrelated. And to be absolute means to be free from contaminations and involvement with the material creation. Harnack had it exactly backward. It wasn’t the orthodox who were Hellenizing the faith; the Arians were the one who were incapable of bursting out of the confines of Greek metaphysics. (See also Zizioulas on how Trinitarian theology burst the categories of Hellenistic thought.)”
Duh. This is what the Orthodox with their “subbiblical” Trinitarianism have been saying all along. Now, does your theology “burst” the categories of Hellenism or think that they are necessary to doing theology proper? Compare and see. Just go read Hodge, Warfield, Turretin, Bavink…err I mean Melancthon, Chemnitz, Walther…err I mean Aquinas, Scotus, Albert…err I mean Augustine…err I mean Plotinus, Proclus…Plato.
An Infallible Council
October 17, 2007“No doubt the party lists were anxiously scanned for an assessment of voting intentions.But a result could only be attained if there was unanimity. The bishops did not come to a council to negotiate a compromise. They came to recognize, and under the Holy Spirit to affirm, the true faith. Unanimity was the guarantee that the Holy Spirit was speaking. Without it a council would fail.”
Norman Russell, Cyril of Alexandria, p. 47
On My Body
October 15, 2007http://www.iranfocus.com/modules/news/article.php?storyid=12781
“Henceforth let no man trouble me; for I bear on my body the marks of Jesus.”
Galatians 6:17
Posted by Perry Robinson
Posted by monkpatrick
Posted by Perry Robinson 