Energetic Procession

Mike Liccione has responded to my post here:

http://mliccione.blogspot.com/2008/08/backward-christian-soldiers.html

Couple of comments and rhetorical question on his choice of title:

Is Maximus the Confessor a “backwards Christian solider”? How about Palamas? Am I making these things up? Of course not. Where do you think I’m learning this “theological anthropology from?”

Notice that in Mike’s post there’s no talk of Christ or Christology. Why is this? This leaves hollow any kind of engagement or refutation from my perspective. Mike’s solution is to give the same standard RC answer whether it is the De Lubac variety or the Garigou Lagrange variety on the “gratuity” of grace. He gives the same answer to the question as a loyal son of Rome. Rome has already dictated how Mike is to see this question.

Mike talks about rights and what man has as his “due” with regard to Michael Baius. But was Michael Baius concerned about “rights” ? And more importantly was Maximus the Confessor concerned about it? Both try to give a patristic answer to a question in theological anthropology. If God created to will the Mystery of His Embodiment, I.e. Jesus Christ, then where is the legal manifestation of this concern? This is a polemical argument with no weight coming from De Lubac, that if one doesn’t see gratuity, i.e. separating nature and grace, then grace must be a “right.” All this highlights, is that they don’t wish to understand the question from there opponents perspective. If this is to be an internal critique and reductio, I suggest they work a little harder. Mike refuses to recognize and engage the ordo theologiae in this thought and the soundness of it: vis., that the gratuity of grace is in the decree of God wishing to be embodied, and in God willing that embodiment, human nature cannot be ‘other’ than what it is because the many logoi–which are the one Logos–are the foundation and FORMAL cause of my being. To point out a saying of St. Dionysios, “the being of beings is the *divinity* beyond being.” God did not create and then tack on the addition of human nature’s “elevation.” He willed this and fixed this already in willing the Incarnation. Nature and grace are indeed distinct, but there is an intimate connection between the two because the very order in which the questions are handled and dealt with: I stand within Christ and understand Creation. I do not stand “outside” of Christ to understand this question. Hence, Mike’s method of how to handle this question is still quite secular. It is not Christ centered. To think of a hypothetically ungraced human is not only Christologically backward, but it would no longer be a “human.” As I have written a few posts lately about the patristic ordo theologiae, ask yourself, did the Fathers refute the heretical Christologies starting from “inside” Christ or did they start from the “outside”?

Mike also makes a few more observations about my comments on the Immaculate Conception from the Eirenikon blog. My engagement against the IC does not stand on moral virtues alone but also on theological virtues. Does the IC imply an infusion of the theological virtues at Mary’s creation? I think that would be a resounding yes. The point is that virtue, as exercised morally or theologically, is acquired by the gnomic will. Since the gnomic will is a type of ‘mode of willing’ for created hypostasis, then there is no IC in the sense that they understand it. All[!] the virtues are indeed natural as regard to their power (nature), but are only recapitulated in their actualization (person). If the IC implies the former, then it is superfluous doctrine and means nothing, if the latter it is an example of predestinarianism or Origenism depending on which side of that dialectic extreme one chooses. The IC is just another example of the confusion between person and nature as this confusion manifests itself in the Roman communion.

3. My statement, then, is this. That which is spoken of in a special and peculiar manner is indicated by the name of the hypostasis. Suppose we say “a man.” The indefinite meaning of the word strikes a certain vague sense upon the ears. The nature is indicated, but what subsists and is specially and peculiarly indicated by the name is not made plain. Suppose we say “Paul.” We set forth, by what is indicated by the name, the nature subsisting.[2024]

This then is the hypostasis, or “understanding;” not the indefinite conception of the essence or substance, which, because what is signified is general, finds no “standing,” but the conception which by means of the expressed peculiarities gives standing and circumscription to the general and uncircumscribed. It is customary in Scripture to make a distinction of this kind, as well in many other passages as in the History of Job. When purposing to narrate the events of his life, Job first mentions the common, and says “a man;” then he straightway particularizes by adding “a certain.”[2025] As to the description of the essence, as having no bearing on the scope of his work, he is silent, but by means of particular notes of identity, mentioning the place and points of character, and such external qualifications as would individualize, and separate from the common and general idea, he specifies the “certain man,” in such a way that from name, place, mental qualities, and outside circumstances, the description of the man whose life is being narrated is made in all particulars perfectly clear. If he had been giving an account of the essence, there would not in his explanation of the nature have been any mention of these matters. The same moreover would have been the account that there is in the case of Bildad the Shuhite, and Zophar the Naamathite, and each of the men there mentioned.[2026] Transfer, then, to the divine dogmas the same standard of difference which you recognise in the case both of essence and of hypostasis in human affairs, and you will not go wrong.

Letter XXXVIII of St. Basil To his Brother Gregory, concerning the difference between οὐσία and ὑπόστασις. NPNF s. II, vol. 8, pp. 137-138.

Footnote 2022 of the NPNF series states this in regard to this Letter:

This important letter is included as among the works of Gregory of Nyssa, as addressed to Peter, bp. of Sebaste, brotherof Basil and Gregory. The Ben. note says: “Stylus Basilii fetum esse clamitat.” It was moreover, referred to at Chalcedon as Basil’s. [Mansi, T. vii. col. 464.]

However, modern scholarship now states that this is in fact a letter penned by St. Gregory of Nyssa. Perhaps it is to another Gregory or to even a budding catechumen or theologian. See the discussions by Fedwich and Cavallin as they document the scholars who attribute this letter to Gregory of Nyssa. For our discussion, whoever of the two Cappadocian brothers wrote this adds little to our concern since the practice of this principle is undoubtedly found in both.